Your system is set to reduce motion, so the operations centre is paused. This screen has attack arcs moving across a map, camera zooms onto sites under attack, and a slow red glow at the screen edges during incidents.
This page is the main wall screen of a security operations centre, the room where a company's security analysts watch for attacks and respond to them. It defends one invented company, XSCRIPT SYSTEMS, with eight sites around the world. A dot-matrix world map shows attacks arcing in from across the globe and breaking on a shield ring around each site. About every five minutes something gets through: a ransomware outbreak, a flood of traffic, a stolen-password attack. The camera flies to the site, opens a diagram of its network, and the incident is worked from detection to resolution. Over the full ten hours, one threat actor, GLASS VIPER, moves through every stage of an intrusion and is found, contained, and removed. Click ⛶ FULLSCREEN and it fills the screen.
No. It is an animation, and both the screen and the bar under it say SIMULATION. The company, its sites and endpoint counts, the threat actor, the analysts and shift leads, the IP addresses, domains, host names, and every line in the alert stream are invented and drawn in your browser. The page makes no connections while it runs, monitors nothing, and cannot reach your computer or anyone else's. The clock on the screen is a simulated UTC time, not your real time.
The shape of it is real, though. The panels, the metrics, the incident phases, and the campaign stages are the ones real security teams use, and the section on what a SOC does below explains each of them.
Two things run at once: routine incidents, about one every five minutes, and one long campaign that takes the whole ten hours.
The ten hours are split into 120 five-minute slots, each holding one incident somewhere inside it. Most incidents last between about 70 seconds and two minutes (the first, a quick one, takes 46 seconds), and each goes through the same four steps.
The routine incident types are ransomware detonation, DDoS flood, C2 beaconing, credential stuffing, insider data movement, zero-day exploit, and malicious package. The most serious ones (level 4 or 5) push the threat level to SEVERE or CRITICAL.
The campaign starts unnoticed: during reconnaissance its three servers show only as faint dashed markers. As the investigation goes on they are identified one by one, labelled GV-C2-1 to GV-C2-3, and their amber traffic is tracked across the map. Four of the 120 incidents are the campaign's milestones, marked with a GLASS VIPER tag. In the eradication stage the servers are sinkholed and crossed out.
| Time | Seconds | Campaign stage or milestone |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00:00 | 0 | Reconnaissance: port sweeps and probing of login pages |
| 00:48:00 | 2880 | Spear-phishing; the first C2 server is identified |
| 00:50:30 | 3030 | Spear-phishing wave at NYC-HQ: 214 lures sent to finance staff |
| 01:54:00 | 6840 | Initial access; the second C2 server is identified |
| 01:55:30 | 6930 | VPN appliance exploit at FRA-DC2 (level 5, CRITICAL) |
| 03:00:00 | 10800 | Persistence: implants and beacons |
| 04:12:00 | 15120 | Lateral movement; the third C2 server is identified |
| 04:15:30 | 15330 | Lateral movement incident at LON-OF |
| 05:24:00 | 19440 | Exfiltration |
| 05:25:30 | 19530 | Exfiltration attempt at SIN-DC3: 2.4 GB staged for upload |
| 06:36:00 | 23760 | Containment: the actor's infrastructure blocked everywhere |
| 07:42:00 | 27720 | Eradication: implants removed, C2 servers sinkholed |
| 08:48:00 | 31680 | Recovery and hunt, to the end of the cycle |
Moments worth seeing in the first hour (seek with the bar or use ?t=):
| Time | Seconds | What happens |
|---|---|---|
| 00:00:00 | 0 | Boot-up: the panels wipe on, the map scans in, and the sites light up |
| 00:00:12 | 12 | Ransomware detonation at DAL-DC1 in Dallas; containment from 0:28, resolved at 0:44 |
| 00:07:17 | 437 | Ransomware detonation at FRA-DC2 in Frankfurt |
| 00:12:14 | 734 | Ransomware detonation at NYC-HQ in New York |
| 00:15:43 | 943 | Zero-day exploit against the application tier at FRA-DC2 |
| 00:23:03 | 1383 | DDoS flood at FRA-DC2 |
| 00:28:02 | 1682 | Credential stuffing at NYC-HQ |
| 00:40:00 | 2400 | Shift handover from APAC (Singapore) to EMEA (Frankfurt) |
| 00:50:30 | 3030 | GLASS VIPER spear-phishing wave at NYC-HQ |
| 00:55:30 | 3330 | C2 beaconing at FRA-DC2 |
Over the full ten-hour cycle there are 120 incidents: 24 ransomware detonations, 21 DDoS floods, 17 cases of C2 beaconing, 14 of credential stuffing, 14 of insider data movement, 13 zero-day exploits, 13 malicious packages, and the 4 campaign milestones. NYC-HQ is hit most often (27 times) and the São Paulo office least (5). The simulated clock runs from 05:20 to 15:20 UTC, so the map's day/night line moves 150 degrees west across the map, and the watch passes from APAC to EMEA at 00:40:00 and from EMEA to AMER at 08:40:00.
?t= and the number of seconds to the address, for example /soc-screen?t=6930 for the VPN appliance exploit. Minutes and hours also work: ?t=50m30s or ?t=5h25m30s.The page draws at the full resolution of your screen, up to 4K. On a slow computer it lowers the resolution by itself to keep the motion smooth.
Background screens for films, series, and adverts set in a security team, a newsroom covering a cyber attack, or a corporate war room; a wall display for a security awareness week, a careers fair stand, or an office lobby; a backdrop for talks, webinars, and podcasts about security; tabletop exercises, where the incident names give the team a scenario to talk through; escape rooms and live-action games that need a "we are under attack" screen; and gaming or coding streams. It is calmer than most hacking screens: the motion is steady, and the drama comes in short incidents. For OBS setup as a browser source, see the streaming toolkit.
A security operations centre is the part of an organisation that watches for attacks and handles them. Some are a room with a wall of screens like this one; many are a team spread over several countries; smaller organisations often pay an outside provider to run one for them. The work is mostly reading, sorting, and deciding. Security tools produce far more alerts than people can look at, so most of a SOC's effort goes into finding the few that matter among the many that do not.
Many SOCs split the work into tiers, though the names and boundaries vary.
Organisations with offices around the world often run the SOC as "follow the sun": teams in different time zones each take an eight-hour shift so nobody works nights. The SOC shift panel shows exactly that, with handovers between Singapore, Frankfurt, and Dallas. A good handover note, listing open cases and anything to keep an eye on, matters as much as any tool.
Cases are usually ranked by priority. P1 is an active, serious incident that needs people on it now; P2 and P3 are lower. The open-alerts tile and the P1/P2/P3 queue show the size of the pile. Two numbers are watched closely. Mean time to detect (MTTD) is how long it takes, on average, to notice something; mean time to respond (MTTR, sometimes mean time to resolve) is how long it then takes to deal with it. Both are tracked over weeks and months rather than minute by minute; the tiles on this screen move faster than real ones would, so there is something to watch.
The biggest everyday problem in a real SOC is alert fatigue: so many low-value alerts that the important one is missed. A lot of the work that never appears on a wall screen goes into tuning rules, automating the dull checks, and deciding what not to alert on.
In 2011 researchers at Lockheed Martin published a paper describing intrusions as a chain of steps, borrowing the military term "kill chain". If defenders can break any link, the attack fails, so it pays to detect intruders as early in the chain as possible. Their seven stages are:
The campaign panel uses a simplified version that a SOC might put on a wall: reconnaissance, spear-phishing (delivery), initial access, persistence, lateral movement, and exfiltration for the attacker, followed by containment, eradication, and recovery for the defenders. Critics point out that the original model fits malware-led intrusions best and says little about what happens once an attacker is inside, which is why lateral movement is usually added as a stage of its own.
Where the kill chain is a rough outline, MITRE ATT&CK is a detailed shared vocabulary. MITRE, a US not-for-profit, maintains a public knowledge base of the tactics attackers use (the goal at each step, such as initial access, persistence, lateral movement, or exfiltration) and, under each tactic, the specific techniques seen in real intrusions. The enterprise matrix has fourteen tactics and hundreds of techniques and sub-techniques. SOC teams use it to label alerts consistently, to check which techniques their detections cover and which they miss, and to compare notes with other organisations. Several of the campaign stage names on this screen are ATT&CK tactic names.
Once an alert is confirmed as an incident, most teams follow a written process. The long-standing version of the US National Institute of Standards and Technology's incident handling guide, SP 800-61, describes four phases:
| Phase | What happens | On this screen |
|---|---|---|
| Preparation | Plans, contacts, tools, and practice before anything goes wrong | The shifts, the playbooks in the alert stream |
| Detection and analysis | Spotting the problem, confirming it is real, and working out its scope | DETECTED and TRIAGE |
| Containment, eradication, and recovery | Stopping the spread, removing the attacker, and restoring normal service | CONTAINING and RESOLVED; the last three campaign stages |
| Post-incident activity | Reviewing what happened and what to change | "Incident closed · report filed" in the stream |
In practice the phases overlap and loop: containing one machine often turns up another. The first thing a team protects is evidence, which is why "snapshot taken" lines appear before a host is wiped.
The whole ten-hour cycle is worked out in advance from a fixed random seed: when each incident starts and which site it hits, and about 154,000 attack arcs, each with its source city, target, type, and flight time. Each arc on the map stands for many blocked attempts, so the per-minute counts in the panels are much larger than the number of arcs. The world map is a grid of one-degree dots from a stored land mask, shaded by a simple model of the sun for mid-November driven by the simulated clock. The camera is a flat map view that zooms smoothly in and out, so a dive onto a site reads as one move. Because every frame is a function of the time alone, the page can jump anywhere in the cycle at once, and the same moment always looks the same. To protect screens left on for hours, the whole layout drifts a few pixels on a slow path.
No. It is an animation. The company, its eight sites, the threat actor GLASS VIPER, the analysts, the IP addresses, the host names, and every alert in the stream are invented and drawn in your browser. The page connects to nothing, monitors nothing, and cannot affect your computer or anyone else's.
A security operations centre (SOC) is the team, and often the room, that watches an organisation's computers and networks for attacks and responds when something goes wrong. Analysts work through alerts from security tools, investigate the ones that matter, and lead the response to confirmed incidents. Large SOCs run around the clock in shifts.
It is a model of the steps an intruder goes through, from researching a target to achieving their goal. Lockheed Martin published the best-known version in 2011 with seven stages: reconnaissance, weaponisation, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on objectives. The idea is that defenders who break any link stop the attack. The campaign panel on this screen uses a simplified chain that ends with the defenders' response.
Ten hours. In that time the SOC handles 120 incidents, one in each five-minute slot, and the GLASS VIPER campaign moves through all nine stages, from reconnaissance at the start to recovery and threat hunting in the last 72 minutes. Then the cycle starts again. The screen is calculated frame by frame rather than played from a recording, so it needs no download and never buffers.
Yes. Drag the seek bar, or press the left and right arrow keys to move ten seconds at a time. To open the page at a given moment, add ?t= to the address with the number of seconds, for example ?t=3030 for the GLASS VIPER spear-phishing wave.
Yes. It is free to use for videos, films, streams, presentations, training sessions, and events. Click FULLSCREEN, or add the page as an OBS browser source at 1920 × 1080 or 3840 × 2160; the scene is drawn at the full resolution of the source.
No. There are no white flashes, full-screen fades, or strobing. While a serious incident is open, the edges of the screen glow red and the glow swells and eases about once every three seconds, then fades as the incident is contained. Blocked attacks make small, brief flashes on the rings around each site. The first few seconds of the cycle are a boot-up in which the panels wipe on. If your system is set to reduce motion, the page opens paused. See accessibility and visual effects for more.
Once the page and its fonts have loaded, the simulation makes no further network requests, so it keeps running if the connection drops. The optional VIDEO view streams from YouTube and needs a connection.
For a wider view of attack traffic between countries, open the cyber attack map; the guide to what a DDoS attack is explains one of the incidents here in more depth. The data centre simulator shows the infrastructure a SOC protects, and the tech dashboard is a general-purpose monitoring wall. For the other side of the story, the system breached screen shows what an attack looks like when the defenders lose.